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THINKING LIKE A LAWYER
PEGGY COOPER DAVIS*
ADERSON BELGARDE FRANCOIS**
"For God's sake, open up the universe a little more."'
Our mission as educators has been to bend the legal academy toward
training for intellectual versatility. Effectiveness in the law requires us to
be logicians, rhetoricians, psychologists and performers all at once, so we
work hard to assure that our students become skilled in each of these
"workways" 2 and learn to integrate them in the process of solving legal
problems.
Carol Gilligan's work and her collegial support have been invaluable to
us in three senses. Gilligan has been generous and brilliant in showing us
how to help students develop the psychological intelligence that is
necessary to successful performance of lawyering's largely relational tasks. 3
Moreover, Gilligan's theories have helped us to understand why relational
thinking is resisted in the legal academy. Finally, Gilligan's work has deep-
ened our understanding of why the cultivation of intellectual versatility is
important to lawyers' professional development.
In what follows, we first explain what it means to train lawyers for
intellectual versatility. We then describe, and attempt to explain, the
resistance this kind of training can engender. Next, we draw on post-realist
legal thought to explain why training for intellectual versatility is necessary
to capable and responsible legal practice. We conclude with suggestions
about how continued engagement with Gilligan's work can deepen our
analysis of why training for intellectual versatility is resisted, and why it is
nonetheless profoundly important.
'Peggy Cooper Davis is the Shad Professor of Lawyering and Ethics and Director of the
Lawyering Program, New York University School of Law.
"Aderson Belgarde Francois, a former Faculty Director of New York University's Lawyering
Program, is an Assistant Professor of Law and Supervising Attorney for the Civil Rights Clinic,
Howard University School of Law.
1. SAUL BELLOW, THE DEAN'S DECEMBER 10 (Penguin Books 1998) (1982).
2. Workways is a term we coined in the 1990s in an effort to organize our thinking about the
intellectual dimensions of lawyering. Our work in what came to be know as the Workways
Project is described at http://www.law.nyu.edu/workways/workways.html (last visited Apr. 6,
2006).
3. See Peggy Cooper Davis, We Can Do Better, 14 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 263 (2002)
(describing collaboration between Davis and Gilligan in developing students' psychological
intelligence that is necessary to lawyers' successful performances in relational tasks).
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I. WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO TRAIN FOR INTELLECTUAL
VERSATILITY?
Intelligence is a plural concept. As we work at professional or personal
projects, we do not use a single capacity, measurable by an IQ test. Rather,
we use a cluster of intelligences. Howard Gardner's carefully formulated
and well-accepted catalogue of human intelligences includes: linguistic
intelligence, having to do with the ordering and meaningful use of words;
logical/mathematical intelligence, having to do with appreciation and repre-
sentation of the relationships among actions or objects; spatial intelligence,
having to do with perception and representation of the visual world;
kinesthetic intelligence, having to do with skillfully expressive or goal-
directed use of the body; intrapersonal intelligence, having to do with
awareness and management of one's emotions; interpersonal intelligence,
having to do with sensitivity and thoughtful response to the emotional lives
of others;4 naturalistic intelligence, having to do with recognizing natural
species and charting the relationships among them; and spiritual intelli-
gence, having to do with comprehension of the existential rather than the
material.5
A practicing professional necessarily uses a variety of intelligences. A
heart surgeon uses spatial intelligence to visualize and plan a procedure and
kinesthetic intelligence to execute the procedure. The same surgeon may
also use intrapersonal intelligence to maintain a healthy emotional equili-
brium and a mix of linguistic, interpersonal, intrapersonal, and kinesthetic
intelligences to communicate effectively with the patient, the patient's
family, and the surgical and post-operative care teams. A businessperson
negotiating a deal needs both linguistic and kinesthetic intelligences to
communicate effectively with existing and potential colleagues. The busi-
nessperson may also rely on logical/mathematical intelligence to make
financial projections and assess alternative decision paths, intrapersonal
intelligence to maintain emotional equilibrium and strategic focus, and
interpersonal intelligence to assess competitive risks and prospects for
productive collaboration.
As Gardner has demonstrated, each intelligence can and should be
developed in each of us. Intelligences are not in the "have it or you don't"
category with naturally curly hair and long legs. They blossom as they are
used, and they grow best with practice in the light of critical reflection. To
4. HOWARD GARDNER, FRAMES OF MIND: THE THEORY OF MULTIPLE INTELLIGENCES 67-
69 (10th Anniversary ed. 1993).
5. HOWARD GARDNER, INTELLIGENCE REFRAMED: MULTIPLE INTELLIGENCES FOR THE
21ST CENTURY 39-54 (1999).
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train a lawyer for intellectual versatility is to assure that s/he has regular,
structured opportunities to use each intelligence relevant to legal practice, to
think critically about how s/he has used it, and to learn to use it better.
II. WHY IS TRAINING LAWYERS FOR INTELLECTUAL
VERSATILITY SO OFTEN RESISTED?
To train lawyers for intellectual versatility is to push them beyond the
domain of logical operations and insist that they think relationally -that
they think about the law as a product of culture and human interaction and
think about using and developing the law in the give and take of
professional practice. Engagement with the relational domains of lawyering
is resisted because it requires serious engagement with stereotypically
feminine issues and serious attention to developing stereotypically feminine
abilities. And even now, when nearly every other law student is a woman, 6
the culture of the legal academy is irrationally averse to the stereotypically
feminine and somewhat obsessed with the stereotypically masculine.
When Lani Guinier famously described the Yale Law School professor
who began each class with the salutation, "Good Morning, Gentlemen," she
captured something important about the law school environment.
Becoming Gentlemen, the Guinier, Fine, and Balin study of the University
of Pennsylvania Law School, established what subsequent studies have
confirmed: law schools tend to encourage top-down, emotionally detached
reasoning and antagonistic interactive strategies and to discourage contex-
tual and relational reasoning and collaborative interactive strategies. 7 As
Guinier, Fine, and Balin explained, women law students often embrace and
excel at the disfavored ways of working, and are disadvantaged and discom-
forted by their suppression. 8
In New York University's Lawyering, Lawyering Theory, and Work-
ways projects, we have worked self-consciously to give equal attention and
respect to the syllogistic and the relational dimensions of legal thought and
6. Law School Admission Council Volume Summary by Ethnic & Gender Group,
http://members.Isacnet.org/ (roll over data button to expand menu; then follow "LSAC Ethnic/
Gender Volume Summary" hyperlink; then follow "Volume Summary Matriculants by Ethnic and
Gender Group" hyperlink) (last visited May 26, 2006).
7. See LANI GUINIER, MICHELLE FINE, & JANE BALIN, BECOMING GENTLEMEN: WOMEN,
LAW SCHOOL, AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 27-29 (Beacon Press 1997) (providing an overview
of the study's results); see also Sarah Berger, Angela Olivia Burton, Peggy Cooper Davis,
Elizabeth Ehrenfest-Steinglass, & Robert Levy, "Hey! There's Ladies Here!!" 73 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1022 (1998) (noting subsequent research); Working Group on Student Experiences, Study of
Women's Experiences at Harvard Law School, http://www.law.harvard.edu/students/experiences/
ExecutiveSummary.pdf (detailing more recent research reaching similar conclusions) (last visited
May 25, 2006).
8. BECOMING GENTLEMEN, supra note 7, at 53-56.
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practice. 9 We have not done this to address the disadvantages and discom-
fort that many women feel in the law school environment (although that is a
valued by-product). Nor have we done it with the thought that "Becoming
Gentlewomen" is the path to professional excellence (although there is
much to be said for gentility as well as for stereotypically feminine values
in professional practice). We have done it because it is crucial to fostering
professional excellence.
We asked ourselves, "What do lawyers actually do?" We noticed that
we interpret laws and facts; we counsel; we represent clients who are
involved in disputes or charged with wrongdoing; and we represent clients
who have projects they want to pursue or relationships they want to forge.
We asked ourselves, "What does it take to do these things?" We concluded
that it takes attention to legal and non-legal norms, to facts, to human de-
sires and to dynamic, and often strategic interactions. We refer to these as
the four lawyering dimensions. Finally, we asked ourselves, "How must
lawyers think in order to do these things well?" We concluded that
lawyering requires the use of linguistic, logical/mathematical, kinesthetic,
intrapersonal, and interpersonal intelligences. Collapsing inter- and intra-
personal intelligences under the label psychological intelligences, we refer
to these as the lawyering intelligences.
We set about to understand the lawyering dimensions and intelligences
and to use that understanding as a basis for our teaching. We redesigned
our Lawyering Program to create a year-long course of study in which
students work under the supervision of expert and critically conscious
practitioners to hone the lawyering intelligences. In each of seven increas-
ingly complex exercises, students learn concepts and vocabularies for
thinking and talking about discrete lawyering tasks; plan collaboratively to
take on a lawyering activity that implicates those tasks; execute their plans;
and engage in painstaking critique of their planning and execution. At each
phase of each exercise, the work of lawyering is analyzed as the exercise of
linguistic, logical/mathematical, kinesthetic, and psychological intelligences
to manage norms, facts, desires and interactive dynamics. This method of
study is illustrated by a grid, designed by Aderson Francois, when he was
faculty director of our Lawyering Program:
9. See, e.g., Workways Overview, http://www.law.nyu.edu/workways/workways.html (last
visited Apr. 6, 2006) (providing an overview of the New York University "Workways" project);
The Lawyering Program, http://www.law.nyu.edu/lawyeringprograml (last visited Apr. 6, 2006)
(describing the program).
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Our goal of intellectual versatility requires that top-down and bottom-
up analysis, logical and relational reasoning, and collaborative and self-
interested strategies be equally valued as tools to be used, often in sur-
prising combinations, for doing the work of lawyering. This means that we
must work against the traditional flow of legal culture to undo the suppres-
sion of relational, contextual, and collaborative thinking. And working
against the traditional flow of a culture is likely to engender resistance.
III. WHY IS TRAINING LAWYERS FOR INTELLECTUAL
VERSATILITY SO IMPORTANT?
There are at least four answers to this question. Two of them are easy
and well-rehearsed; the other two are at the growing edge of our thinking.
First, as we have already said, intellectual versatility is necessary to
competent practice. Although law schools in the United States traditionally
have given too little attention to the art of practice,10 there is reason to think
10. See Robert MacCrate, Narrowing the Gap, Legal Education and Professional
Development-An Educational Continuum, 1992 A.B.A. SEC. LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO
THE BAR 3-4 (discussing the gap between what law schools traditionally teach and the expec-
tations of practitioners for new attorneys when they enter the workforce); Roger Cramton, Lawyer
Competence: The Role of the Law Schools, 1979 A.B.A. SEC. LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO
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that we will mend our "praxiphobic" ways. The early legal realists de-
manded this when they called for a "lawyer school" rather than a law
school.11 The American Bar Association's 1992 MacCrate Commission
made the same call, and the ABA has followed through with requirements
that law schools offer clinical education to at least some of their students12
and skills training of some sort to all.1 3 The more care we take to prepare
students for practice, the more we will need to train them to be intellectually
versatile.
Second, lawyers who are intellectually narrow tend to skew the legal
system toward approaching problems in formalistic and agonistic ways. To
understand how and why this is so, consider the Francois grid again. The
traditional law school curriculum emphasizes the application of logical/













Every competent lawyer must be skilled at logical manipulation of legal
norms and facts. But lawyers who rely exclusively on this set of skills tend
THE BAR 15-17 (urging law schools to place additional emphasis on practical skills such as
teamwork and oral communication).
11. See, e.g., Jerome Frank, A Plea for Lawyer-Schools, 56 YALE L.J. 1303 (1947).
12. Standards: Rules of Procedure for Approval of Law Schools, 2006 A.B.A. SEC. LEGAL
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to gravitate to the problem-solving strategies for which it is most
appropriate: litigation and positional bargaining. They will litigate and
bargain less well for their lack of intellectual versatility. This is so because
a litigation or negotiation is as likely to turn on psychologically mindful
advocacy, strategic linguistic choices, or artful and culturally appropriate
presentation as on solid logical analyses of law and fact. But they will
nonetheless be more comfortable litigating or bargaining positionally than
counseling to avoid conflict or mediating conflict when it arises. On the
other hand, lawyers who layer on linguistic, kinesthetic, and psychological
competence are able to work comfortably not only in litigation or positional
bargaining, but also in interest bargaining, mediation, collaborative prob-
lem-solving, and in-depth counseling to avoid or manage conflict and risk.
The third value of a lawyer's intellectual versatility is that it improves
performance in every dimension of practice. We alluded to this when we
said that litigation and positional bargaining are better done from a position
of versatility-using logical/mathematical intelligence in the analysis of
facts and governing law, and linguistic, kinesthetic, and psychological
intelligences in investigation, case-building and argumentation. But the
point runs deeper. As we have been told since the dawn of legal realism,
the operations of legal analysis that have been at the center of the traditional
law school curriculum are not matters of simple logic. They are indeter-
minate and necessarily subjective. They mix logic with policy judgment
and justice concerns. They depend on lawyers' intrapersonal capacities to
calm biases in order to hear all that can be reasonably said on each side of a
question. They are discursive operations and therefore affected by our
responses to narrative, to rhetoric, and to the quality of an interactive per-
formance. This means that we can use every bit and kind of intelligence to
interpret and argue legal norms.
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Finally, to see lawyering as a mix of logical, linguistic, performative,
and psychological work is to see its ethical requirements more richly. If
law were nothing more than competitive logic games, we lawyers would do
well enough if we argued honestly and zealously. To argue the law hon-
estly and zealously is a challenge, to be sure. But responsible lawyering
requires more. It requires that we attend to how bias and emotion affect our
reasoning; that we attend to the integrity of our relationships with clients,
colleagues, opposing counsel and decision-makers; and that we attend to the
immediate and long term effects of our language and performances.
IV. DEEPENING THE ANALYSIS
The sum of our analysis of legal practice is that lawyering, like many
professions and more so than most, is relational rather than all in the head.
It involves language, performance, and the management of emotion and
desire as much as it involves logic and numbers. We have observed that
members of the legal academy are likely to resist this difficult but important
message. In our ongoing efforts to promote professional training for
intellectual versatility, we look to Gilligan's work to deepen our analysis,
both of the resistance to training for intellectual versatility and of the value
of doing so.
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A. THE RESISTANCE
Gilligan's research shows that inhibitions about relational thinking are
likely to develop in the preschool years for boys and in adolescence for girls
as a hierarchical order that has its foundation in the family-separates,
nurturers and providers.14 In this order, women are seen as nurturers who
must be self-denying. Relational thinking is not suppressed, but it is com-
promised as attention to the self is suppressed. The compromise occurs
because a complete relational analysis must involve an analysis of a self in
relation to others. Men, on the other hand, are seen in the hierarchical order
as protector-providers who must have an aloof toughness. Development for
the protector-provider is defined as separation from the relational intimacy
of infancy and early childhood. Relational thinking is likely to be sup-
pressed because it is identified with that intimacy and with the (usually
maternal) caregiver with whom it was shared.15
This developmental story helps us to see why a historically male pro-
fession might embrace the logical/mathematical and neglect the linguistic,
kinesthetic, and psychological work without which parsing the logic of
cases is an empty exercise. Linguistic, kinesthetic and psychological
analyses are most often relational. An argument, for example, is crafted to
appeal to a decision maker; body language is interpreted by an observer or
controlled with an audience in mind; mood and motivation are read to
assess relational possibilities or consequences. If our capacity for relational
thinking is suppressed, it is natural that we will attempt to confine our
professional practice to the psychologically safer domain of the equation or
syllogism. This is not to say that relational thinking is significantly sup-
pressed in all men or in all members of the legal profession. It is simply to
say that where cultural forces contribute to the suppression of relational
thinking among men, a historically male profession is likely to privilege
non-relational aspects of its work.
The developmental story also helps us to see how professional
women's relational thinking might be compromised or suppressed. Some
women will resist or overcome social pressures to leave the self out of the
relational equation, just as some men will resist social pressures to suppress
the relational altogether. But some will assume a self-denying stance that
a
14. CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S
DEVELOPMENT 8-9 (Harvard Univ. Press 1993) (1982).
15. See Peggy Cooper Davis and Carol Gilligan, A Woman Decides: Justice O'Connor and
Due Process Rights of Choice 32 MCGEORGE L. REV. 895, 897-900 (2001) (describing Gilligan's
developmental theories).
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compromises sound relational analysis, and others will assimilate, at least in
their professional lives, to anti-relational norms.
Gilligan's work also helps us understand the intensity of inhibitions
that suppress or compromise relational work. She describes the boy's sup-
pression of the relational and the girl's suppression of the relational self as
dissociations-as examples of a psychological "splitting" that leaves us
unable to "know what we know." Dissociation is an extreme act of psycho-
logical self-defense. It is most commonly understood as a reaction to
trauma, as when victims of physical abuse carry subconscious memories of
the violence they have suffered. For Gilligan, the injunction that little boys
suppress the relational altogether and the injunction that adolescent girls
suppress the relational self are acts of psychic violence, and the resultant
dissociation is as intense as that of any trauma victim.1 6 To understand
dissociation in this way is to understand more deeply why it is hard to per-
suade developing lawyers to engage the relational dimensions of their work.
B. THE IMPORTANCE
In her more recent writing, Gilligan has argued that overcoming
dissociation and entering the relational world with open eyes is necessary,
not only to the emotional health of individuals, but also to the health of any
democratic society.' 7 Her premise is that hierarchy threatens the health of
both personal and political relationships. Applying Gilligan's theories of
relational psychology to the political sphere would be hugely consequential,
and we have only begun to mine the implications of doing so. But some
things seem clear at this early stage of our thinking. An anti-hierarchical
approach to lawyering in a democratic society would require that we
mitigate the hierarchical effects of professional status. This would require
in turn more extensive and more comprehending communication between
lawyers and their clients. An anti-hierarchical approach to private problem-
solving would require that we place less faith in hierarchy-enhancing,
winner-take-all solutions. This would require in turn more extensive and
comprehending communication between the principals and lawyers on each
side of a dispute or transaction. And an anti-hierarchical approach to the
development and application of law would require that we be sensitive at all
timas to the law's hierarchical or egalitarian effects. This would require in
turn that we probe with care the individual and social consequences of the
interpretations we argue and laws for which we lobby. If any of these
16. See CAROL GILLIGAN, THE BIRTH OF PLEASURE: A NEW MAP OF LOVE 20-24 (Vintage
Books 2003) (2002).
17. Id. at 16, 229-31.
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approaches is warranted, then the need for intellectually versatile lawyering
is all the more urgent.
Thinking like a lawyer is all the more interesting once we recognize its
multiple dimensions. With the great benefit of Gilligan's presence and sup-
port, we have been able at New York University School of Law to under-
stand and mitigate resistance to serious study of the relational dimensions of
legal thought. In the resulting climate of openness and intellectual breadth,
we are able to pursue with optimism the deeply important work of edu-
cating lawyers, not only to be proficient, but also to practice in ways that
improve the character of our legal system.

